Monarch, Malik and Mullā and the Traditional Authority Pattern among the Afghans (1747–1880)

[*] Dr. Ghulam Shams-ur-Rehman

Abstract

This research aims to discuss the social structure of the Afghan society and its authority patterns, and to show how the fragile social structure contributed to the ascendancy of religious class. We shall explore the authority patterns and inherent flaws of the Pashtun confederacy (r. 1747-1880) that was replaced by Afghan monarchy (r. 1880-1973) which contributed for the rise of religious authority. Moreover, the all-inclusive understanding of the socio-religious and political structure of Afghans enables us to identify the traditional authority patterns and how they contributed to form enviable grounds for religious class to hold the political power by replacing the traditional authorities of Afghan state and society. In order to understand the traditional authority patterns, we shall briefly discuss sources of authority in Afghan society ranging from the khānadān, tribe, religion and pashtunwali. In the history of modern Afghanistan, three M (monarch, malik, and mullā) contested for authority. The monarch's desire to establish a centralised government might not be realised without undermining the authority of the malik and mullā. On the other hand, the malik resisted for maintaining the status quo. The mullā's authority in traditional structure was minimal. Therefore, they resented against both monarch and malik. Through this assessment, we shall attempt to show the extent to which a shift from social structure to religious structure took place during the course of Pashtun confederacy in Afghanistan.

Key words: Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah Abdali, Amir Abd al-Rahman, Authority Patterns, Religion and Pashtunwali.

Introduction:

Respect for the authority is one of the most fundamental elements of Afghan society. Social norms and tribal codes of all ethnic groups acknowledge the importance of well-established authority in each family, clan and tribal unite. The khānadān (family) is a basic unit where all members of the family recognize the authority of the head who is the eldest member of the family or his appointed heir. The family units on the basis of common blood relation form a collective identity of kinship, and they generate collective authority through unified idioms in the jargah (assembly or council) of each tribal unit, while the tribal jargah is a step forward for a collective expression of tribal authority. The head of kinship and tribal leader are selected in the jargahs on the basis of their age, status, wealth, wisdom, religious zeal, and valour. The tribal leader is called a malik, khan, or sardār, depending on the area. All tribes abide by their code of conduct. Moreover, nirkh (a distinctive customary law of each tribe) should be honoured through mutual understanding and agreements. The tribal chief does not have ultimate authority in all tribal affairs; rather, he has to discuss every important issue in the jargah; where he seeks the opinion of heads of clans, and decision has to be made by open acclamation. The tribal autonomy is the most enduring feature of tribal life.

Prior to the Durrani confederacy, the present-day Afghanistan has been a marginal territory under its neighbouring empires, while the tribes enjoyed utmost autonomy. However, under Ahmad Shah Durrani, the chiefs of different tribes gathered for establishing a greater authority through selection of a chief of all chief-called amīr or shah. The amīr or shah has to seek the authority by acquiring the allegiance of tribal chiefs in a loya jargah (a grand

---

[*] Associate Professor, Department of Islamic Studies, Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan

assembly of chiefs) of *maliks/ khans/ sardars* and the mullās, though practically it happened only symbolically. The mullā is particularly invited in the *jargah* when the issue is related to the religion and he enjoys advisory position in the *jargah*. Theoretically, in the *jargah*, the *amīr* has to follow the Pashtun tradition, according to which all members have equal position, and the *amīr* has to make decisions according to the aspiration of collective opinion. Thus, the collective authority rests in the hand of monarch and tribal leaders, while the religious class is an advisory group for guidance in religious affairs. Mullās in Afghanistan were mostly adherents of Sunni Islam from the rule of Maḥmūd Ghaznawi (r. 997-1030). Mir Waiz and Ahmad Shah Durrani consolidated the Sunni Islam in Afghanistan during 18th century. Thus, during the Afghan confederacy mullās participated in politics and attended the *jargahs*.[1]

Authority Patterns in Afghan Traditions:

Three *M* (monarch, *malik*, and *mullā*) became the main sources of authority in Afghanistan, where we can observe a perpetual conflict between the three *M* on the issue of authority. The monarch attempted to reduce the power of both the *mullā* and *malik*, while the *mullā* was not pleased with his existing advisory status; rather he desired to have a larger share in the authority. On the other hand, the *malik* just interested with the maintaining the status quo. Through outlining the characters of three *M*, we shall outline the patterns of authority in the traditional Afghan society.

Monarch:

The traditional power structure of Afghan society was based on the royal family, and *maliks/khans* who maintained their power through hospitality and political horse-trading. However, the blood relation and tribal lineage played a significant role to achieve the legitimacy and high ranks. All Kings of Afghanistan from 1747 to the 1973 belonged to the Durrani tribes who traced their genealogical root back to Qays Abdul Rashid – a companion of the Prophet Muhammad– and they were proud of it.[2] Griffin analyses that even poor Durranis regard themselves as Brahmin in the informal system of clan caste which prevails among the Pashtun. They are fastidious observers of the four pillars of Islam – prayer, fasting, alms and pilgrimage; but fifth an invisible pillar exists under the *pashtunwali* in the co-dependency of ancestral virtue and perceived piety.[3] The monarch exercised the dual status: the chief of his tribe and chief of all tribal chiefs. The monarch's dual position restricted him to exercise absolute powers. The monarch had to design a national policy which might extend the authority of one tribe and limit the others. On the other hand, being a tribal chief, he had to respect the *nirkh* (customary law of a tribe) of every tribe. Afghan monarch had been vulnerable and could not consolidate his absolute authority due to the intrinsic inconsistency of his powers. Moreover, according to the tradition, the monarch is bound to call a *loya jargah* (grand assembly of tribal chiefs and nobles) for the rectification of his reforms. Obviously, the reforms which may reduce the authority of tribal chiefs and mullās, could not get approved, particularly, in the tribal society where agreeing on the reduction of one's own autonomy was an act of great shame. The monarch use of Islam to exert his power, ironically, brought more disadvantages: inclusion of religious class in the political arena. Consequently, the authority remained swinging between the three *M*: monarch, *malik* and *mullā* since Amir Abd Rahman (r. 1880-1901) established the Pashtun monarchy in modern Afghanistan in 1880.

The Pashtun confederacy did not attempt to bring the non-Pashtuns into national political structure. On the other hand, non-Pashtun did not take part in mainstream politics. All

significant matters from selection and succession of the monarch to the policy making carried out by his own Pashtun ethnic brethren. Furthermore, all important government and military posts were filled by the Pashtuns. Therefore, it could be observed that the non-Pashtun remained isolated from the monarch's policies, and the monarch could not gather their support whenever he had to face the opposition of his Pashtuns fellows. This particular situation can be viewed throughout the history of Pashtun monarchy.

Tribal Chief: Malik/ Khan/Sardār:

The rural and nomadic Afghan tribes are semi-independent political units. Every tribe has a certain territory, and it is the responsibility of each member of the tribe to defend his land and people from all internal and external threats through the implementation of their customary law: *nirkh*. Afghanistan predominately comprises of rural peasantry society. Generally, the village is a social unit where its inhabitants share common ancestry and identity. Most of the villages consist of a single ethnic community or tribe, and its people are tied with numerous material and kinship relations, and usually the elder son inherits the office of his father as a tribal chief. In most areas of the country, a series of villages consist of a single ethnic group such as Hazaras in Hazārajāt and Pashtun in Southern Afghanistan and Chahar Aimak in Hari Rud Valley. However, in the north of the country is much multi-ethnic where Pashtun, Tajiks and Uzbeks are living in separate adjoining villages. Their local *jargahs* are organised to consider a common issue.

All tribes elect their chiefs (*malik/khan*) through open acclamation by the tribal *jargah* (council) on the basis of age, status, wealth, wisdom and religious piety of the candidates. Though in practice, usually the eldest son of the previous *malik* is elected because of his senior lineage (*khan kheil*). The tribal chief is not autocrat in the tribal structure; he had to consult the *jargah* in all important internal and external matters. Therefore, the chief exercises dual authority: as a member of the tribe, he does not have any privilege over any other member of his tribe while being a tribal chief, he exercises central authority in the intertribal warfare and annual migrations. He also has authority to resolve the issue on the basis of existing precedents without calling a *jargah*. A kind of "tribal democracy" can be observed among the Afghan's tribal structure which is often viewed potential for future democracy.[4] On the basis of the *jargah* system, Caroe argues that "there is here an opportunity for wedding Pathan ideas of tribal organization with the western concept of representative institutions. Where the tribal system is still working, its instrument is the *maliks* and elders sitting in conclave, surrounded by as many of the younger warriors as may have presence and personality enough to be admitted without question….The unwritten law is that the *jargah* takes decisions which in the end overbear opposition and are accepted as unanimous…The essential point is that everything takes place in the open and there is nothing like secret ballot."[5] One of the most important duties of the tribal chief is to provide a bridge between the tribe and central government. He makes workers available for road and canal construction, and recruitments to the national army. The tribal chiefs also elect tax-collector who collects taxes according to the requirement of the central government and delivers them to the provincial governor.[6] We shall concentrate on this point in the latter part of our discussion.

Religious Class: Mullā/ Pīr/ Sayyid:

Traditionally the religious leaders have a great influence in Afghan society by virtue of their position as Islamic scholar and spiritual leader. The religious class comprises of three categories: *sayyid*, *pīr*, and mullā. The *sayyids* are supposed descendent of the Prophet. They

do not necessarily lead the people for the performance of daily rituals in the mosque. Rather these duties are left for the Mullās. The *sayyid*'s prestige is based on their blood relation with the Prophet, and is not limited to a particular tribe. Thus, they enjoy supra-tribal prestige. In case of unresolved inter-tribal conflicts, they are requested to resolve the issue in the *jargah*.[7]

A *sayyid* is respected more if he has religious knowledge and spirituality. A *pīr* is a spiritual leader mostly associated with the shrine. As contrast to the village mullā, a *pīr* is respected among many tribes. More importantly, a *pīr* organizes his network outside the village social structure and attempts to establish "normative patterns of social behaviour" whereas a mullā works within the village social structure under the authority of the tribal chief.[8]

The mullā's prestige among the Afghans is high because of his religious credentials. Although, theoretically, there is no ordained priesthood in Islam, and anyone who can recite a number of verses of the *Qur'ān* may lead the canonical prayers, but practically every hamlet of Afghanistan has almost its *musjid* and mullā. Mullā derives his authority from his historic role of interpreter of Islamic teaching and law. The mullā contributed a significant role to prepare the masses for *jihad*, particularly in the days of Anglo-Afghan and Soviet-Afghan wars. Nonetheless, religious class always venerated in Afghan society but their authority in political affairs was not established during the Durrani's confederacy. As Maron mentions that "the mullā does not hold a very high position in tribal society merely by virtue of his calling".[9] Most of the rural mullā were not authorities on Islamic teachings. Sometimes, they had been under strict criticism because of their conflicting views and aggressive behaviour. Nevertheless, they were generally respected because of their preaching of truth, justice and sobriety.[10]

Authority Pattern and the Durrani Confederacy (r. 1747-1880) :

The establishment of the Durrani confederacy developed the sense of collective identity among the Pashtuns. The early Durranis successfully maintained equilibrium between the tribes and central government, as they did not interfere much in the tribal affairs. They collected large amount of revenue from the non-Pahsutn provinces of neighbouring empires which were then under the domain of Kandahar and Kabul. The conscription of the Pashtun might have created hostility among them, but through the *jihad* rhetoric, the central government successfully managed the military support of tribesmen against non-Muslim of India, Sikhs and British forces or against their own Shiʿi Muslim fellows in Hazarajat.[11]

Ahmad Shah Durrani and his early successors successfully established the Pashtun rule in the region on the basis of their Sunni identity. To enhance the Sunni identity, the early Durranis always welcomed the Mujaddidiyyah —a *sharīʿah* oriented reformist Sufi order— to Afghanistan, where they played a significant cultural and political role.[12] The seventeenth century Muslim theorist and reformist Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1624) challenged many pluralistic Sufi theories which led him to devise a radical and puritanical design for his reformist agenda.[13] The Mujaddidiyah presumably gave the impetus to puritanical Islam in South Asia and Afghanistan, which was projected during the last half of seventeenth century by Mogul emperor Aurangzeb (d. 1707).[14] These puritanical ideas fostered during the decline of Mughals in India. The reformism of Shah Waliullah Dihlawi (d. 1762) — another Mujaddidi theorist— was focused on his wider understanding of Islamism and developing a coherence and integration of divergent and conflicting ideas of different sections of Muslim community with a desire of Islamic revivalism. He also had been best known for his efforts

to restore the Muslim rule in India by appealing to Ahmad Shah Durrani to destroy the ascending power of Hindu Marathas. However, his Mujāhid followers Sayyad Ahamd (d. 1831) and Sayyad Ismail (d. 1831) had continuously promoted his reformism. It is interesting to analyze how reformist Mujaddidi Sufis absorbed the elements of anti-Sufi Wahabbi ideology during the last three centuries. These Mujaddidis had grave impact on the subsequent Islamic thought in South Asia and Afghanistan. Thus, presumably the Mujaddidis prepared the soil for the acceptance of more strict and radical interpretation of Islam e.g. Wahhabism in the region.[15]

The *pashtunwali* determines and defines the authority and role of social actors. It also delineates the authority of tribal chief, and council of tribal elders and religious class: *pīr*, *sayyid*, and *mullā*. Religious class is often consulted in intra-tribal conflicts; particularly when an issue is related to religion or remained unresolved, because of continuous inter-tribal or intra-tribal conflicts. In this scenario, religious leadership comes forward to play its role in resolving the conflict amicability. This was the state of affair till the establishment of Ahmad Shah Durrani's Pashtun monarchy. Ahmad Shah Durrani, as mentioned earlier, invited many Mujaddidi scholars in order to show his religious propensity, and to seek the religious legitimacy as well. Furthermore, he and his successors always sought a *fatwa* (Islamic religious verdict) by the religious scholars for their alleged jihad against Marhatas and Sikhs in India and against the British forces in Anglo-Afghan wars in Afghanistan. Since then, the role of religious leadership became the part of Pashtun political culture. They questioned the validity of social norms on the basis of Islamic law. The *pashtunwali* was not considered as anti-religious rather it was regarded as a social formation of religious ideology in the Pashtun society. The question of the duality of Pashtun culture and religion thus never came into question prior to the establishment of Pashtun monarchy in Kandahar. The Mujadidi scholars of Indian orientation questioned the validity of some norms of the *pashtunwali*. By the time, the Pashtun norms came under severe criticism in the first half of eighteenth century by the scholars of *Taḥrīk-e Mujāhidīn*. To what extend the movement remained successful in its aims is a matter of further investigation. However, the movement put some serious question marks on the capability and compatibility of *pashutnwali* with the *sharī'ah* laws upon which the traditional authority patterns were established.

The early Pashtun monarchies were more successful as they collected enough revenue from non-Pashtun regions and its Indian provinces by maintaining equilibrium of tribal authority patterns. Barfield argues that 'this was good choice since it reduced local opposition to the government in areas where it had historically recruited irregular troops'.[16] However, the later Pashtun rulers, due to lack of power and loss of rich territory of their kingdom, had to promulgate laws for taxation, revenue collection and conscription in order to maintain their central government. The Pashtun tribes perceived these reforms as a restriction to their autonomy. Since then, the politics of religion and *pashtunwali* is going on between central government and rural tribes.

Anglo-Afghan wars gave the Pashtun a collective cause which entailed to the development of national cohesion and communal identity. The Pashtun monarchy used the socio-religious drivers to establish a stable centralized government capable of waging *jihad* against the British forces. The mullā's active role to urge the tribesmen on *jihad* gave him a high-status in the society, where he undermined the traditional authority of tribal chief. On the issue of tribal autonomy and conscription, mullā favoured the monarch against the aspirations of tribal chief who perceived these measures as reduction to his authority. One may observe

that religious class has gradually gained more share of authority in the Pashtun society, but overall the traditional structure of authority remained intact.

The decisive change in traditional authority pattern emerged national state of Afghanistan came into existence in 1880. Amir Abd al-Rahman exerted his authority to the tribal chiefs, and established a centralised government of Kabul. The international powers of Great Britain and Russia compelled the *amir* not to encroach from the existing bounders they marked (some of them without his consent) for creating a buffer state between their empires as a part of the Great Game.[17] They also recognised the *amīr*'s authority and the existence of Afghanistan as an independent state in domestic affairs while its foreign policy was steered by the Great Britain. Amir Abd al-Rahman with the help of British financial aid and Islamic rhetoric extended his rule to the region areas which is now Modern-day Afghanistan.[18] The present Afghanistan is more or less the same that was demarcated in his reign between Russia, China, and British government of India.[19] However, Afghanistan as a sovereign state was recognised in 1919 under the Treaty of Rawalpindi.[20]

The central government's use of Islam for nation-building enhanced the status of the mullā. The monarch sought their support for his national reforms and policies, where the mullā successfully gathered high-positions in national politics and in certain cases his role was considered decisive. More or less, all Afghan kings, except Amir Abd al-Rahman,[21] were much influenced by the mullās. Amir Habib Allah had to cooperate with them according to their terms and conditions. Amanullah's rule came to an end because of mullās' hostile opposition. Nadir Shah not only accepted their demands regarding the elimination of Aman Allah's reforms, but also conferred them recognition in his constitution. Zahir Shah's gradual and cautious reforms had reduced the power of mullā; even then he had to pretend himself a sincere follower of Islam and an adherent of the Hanafi School of law. The constitution 1964 affirms that the monarch must be a Muslim, follower of the *ḥanafi* legal system, and the law of the country would not be contradictory to the *ḥanafi* jurisprudence.[22] A slight reduction in mullā's authority has been observed during the last two decades of Zahir Shah's reign. However, they emerged with more force during the resistance movement against the Socialist regimes. In my standpoint, Amir Abd al-Rahman's use of Islam in order to consolidate his authority gave the mullā a significant space in political arena of Afghanistan. In the twentieth century, the *amīr*'s successors could not restrict the ascendancy of religious leadership in political affairs of the state. Their role became central in Afghan society during the Soviet resistance movements, and they emerged as one of the most influential political actors at the end of communist regime. A big change has been observed in the traditional Afghan religious leadership. They learnt much from their external jihadist fellows. The traditional religious leadership was based and classified either on the basis of their hereditary claim of pious ancestry like *sayyids* and *pīrs*, or their affiliation with their institutions from where they were educated and trained like Madrasah Shāhi ʿUlamā and Deobandi ʿUlamā or their rural and urban attachments. The Madrasah Shāhi of Kabul lost much of its central role for the training of ʿUlamā, whereas, significant theological and ideological changes have been observed in the Deobandi tradition, a kind of neo-Deobandism has been emerged during last forty years particularly in the region across the Durand Line. Moreover, there has been a noticeable impact of the global Islamist of *Jamāʾat-e Islāmi*, Pakistan, *Ikhwān al-Muslmūn*, and the *Wahhābiyah* in the region. On the other hand, the Afghan Shi'i organisations associated themselves closely with their Iranian fellows. It is important to examine carefully these interlinks and their impact on the Afghan society.

The traditional social structure through which various segments of the Afghan society play a meaningful role for national cohesion, solidarity, peace and security, has been gradually shattered due to the perpetual conflict between the central government and tribal chiefs (*malik*, *khan*, *sardār*). Amir Abd al-Rahman, the founder of modern Afghanistan, (r. 1880-1901) attempted to build an Afghan national state through establishing the institutions for central government. The religious leadership, according to the traditional authority patterns, was not mandated to involve directly in politics except giving guidance and assistance to the rule in religious and jihad affairs. The state's use of Islam since the reign of Amir Abd al-Rahman empowered the religious leadership into the political arena at all levels. The religious leadership consolidated gradually its authority in politics which culminated on the establishment of Islamists and Taliban regimes, undermining the authority of monarch/ central government and tribal leaders. Afghanistan, for the first time in the history, was dominated exclusively religious class during the Islamists and Taliban's regimes after the fall of communist government of Kabul in 1992. Ironically the opposition was also structured on religious grounds as a legacy of the Soviet resistance movement. The vulnerability of traditional authorities created a political vacuum where the Taliban asserted their absolute authority. However, the present study confirms that the traditional authority patterns remained unchanged during the Afghan Confederacy (r. 1747-1880), while a decisive change can be observed after establishment of National State of Afghanistan.

Endnotes

[1] Smith, Harvey H., *Area Handbook for Afghanistan*, (Washington, D.C: U.S. Govt. Print Off. 1969) , pp. 175, 176.

[2] Caroe, Olaf, *The Pathans, 550 B.C. − A.D. 1957*, (London: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 11-24, 42.

[3] Griffin, Michael, *Reaping The Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan*, (London: Pluto Press, 2001, p. 54.

[4] Smith, *Area Handbook*, p. 87.

[5] Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 411.

[6] Smith, *Area Handbook*, p. 191.

[7] Scott, George B. *Afghan and Pathan/ a sketch*. (London: Mitre Press, 1929), p. 33.

[8] Ahmed, Akbar S. *Millennium and Charisma among Pathans: A Critical Essay in Social Anthropology*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), p. 55.

[9] Maron, Stanley, *Pakistan: Society and Culture*, (New Haven, Connecticut: Human Relation Area Files, 1957), p. 140; Steul, Willi, *Paschtunwali: e. Ehrenkodex und seine rechtliche Relevanz/* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1981), p. 93.

[10] Merk observes that the mullās are: "Arrogant and overbearing, factious among themselves, fanatically bigoted, narrow and ignorant, respected and feared by the people, they are not without good qualities. Though their attention is much directed to ceremonial trifles and their time wasted in disputations of technical niceties or in intestine intrigue, yet their voice is always heard on the side of order and justice, and their influence exerted towards the healing of disputes. For selfish purposes they encourage the superstitious bias of the people, but at the same time they inculcate truth, purity, sobriety; and ineffectual though they may be, their efforts are never unceasing to eradicate the degrading custom of barter and sale of women, universal strong among the Afghan." Merk W.R.H. *Report on the Mohmands*, (Lahore. Punjab Government Press, 1898), p.20

[11] Barfield, Thomas, *Afghanistan A Cultural and Political History*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 112, 157, 184

[12] Habibi, Abd al-Hayi, *Tarikh-e-Mukhtasar-i-Afghanistan*, (A Short History of Afghanistan), (Kabul: De Kitab Chapawulu Moassasa, 1346/1967), Vol. 2, p. 137

[13] Fazl Allah, *Umdah al-Maqamat*, (Kabul: Kitab-Khana-e-Numani, 1355/1914), pp. 153-156.

[14] Aurangzeb was closely attached to Khwaja Muhammad Masoom, the third son and successor of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi. Their mutual correspondence shows that how much Aurangzeb was devoted to him and sought his opinion in religious and political matters.

[15] Allen, Charles, *God's Terrorist, The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad*, (London: Little, Brown, 2006), pp. 31-34.

[16] Barfield, *Afghanistan*, p. 112

[17] Shahrani, Nazif M., War, Factionalism, and the State in Afghanistan, in *American Anthropologist*, New Series, Vol. 104, No. 3 (Blackwell Publishing: Sep., 2002), pp. 715-722 at p. 718.

[18] The British government gave regular subsidies to the *amīr*; 1.2 million rupees annually from 1883 to the end of his reign. The subsidies were raised to 1.8 million rupees annually with the Durand Agreement in 1993. Moreover, the special grants were given to him in 1880, 1881, 1887. He received in sum 28.5 million rupees from the British during his reign. Kakar, M. Hasan, *Government and Society in Afghanistan: the Reign of Abd al-Rahman Khan*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), p. 90.

[19] Dupree, Louis, *Afghanistan*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press: 1980), pp. 417-429.

[20] Smith, *Area Handbook*, pp. 37, 38.

[21] Amir Abd al-Rahman presented himself as a champion of Islam, and promoted the idea of divine right of kings. He assumed the title *Ḍiyā al-Millati wa 'l-Dīn* (the Light of the Nation and Faith) and claimed that as God's vice-regent on earth, it was his duty to implement divine law. On the other hand, he brought the religious endowments (*awqaf*) under the direct control of government which reduced the authority of religious leadership, and made them dependent on the government. Kakar, M. Hasan, *Government and Society in Afghanistan: the Reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan,* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979). pp. 8, 152; Ashraf Ghani, "Islam and State building in a Tribal Society Afghanistan: 1880-1901", in *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 2, (Cambridge University Press: 1978), pp. 269-284, at , 279, Ghobar, M.G.M. *Afghanistan dar Massir-e-Tarikh*, (Afghanistan in the way of history), (Kabul: Muassesa-Chap-i-Kutub, 1346/1967), p. 647; Nawid, Senzil K., *Religious Response to Social Change in Afghanistan 1919-29 King Aman-Allah and the Afghan Ulama*, (Costa Mesa, California: Mazda Publishers, 1999), p. 29.

[22] Smith, *Area Handbook*, pp.157, 164.